Education Lost: The Homeless Children\u27s Right to Education by Hughes, Andrew S.
Santa Clara Law Review
Volume 30 | Number 3 Article 5
1-1-1990
Education Lost: The Homeless Children's Right to
Education
Andrew S. Hughes
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Law Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Santa Clara Law Review by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.
Recommended Citation
Andrew S. Hughes, Comment, Education Lost: The Homeless Children's Right to Education, 30 Santa Clara L. Rev. 829 (1990).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview/vol30/iss3/5
COMMENTS
EDUCATION LOST: THE HOMELESS CHILDREN'S
RIGHT TO EDUCATION*
I. INTRODUCTION
Although it is very difficult to establish with great preci-
sion the number of homeless' in America today, their num-
ber is estimated at over three million.2 Even more alarming
than the increase in the overall homeless population is the
change in the composition of the homeless population. The
number of homeless with children is drastically increasing
and it is now estimated that "40 percent of the homeless
population consists of ... families."' This translates into
"[a]bout 500,000 children [living in a] homeless" state,4 many
deprived of food, shelter, and education.
Because of this increase in homeless families, and
homelessness in general, Congress, in 1987, passed the Stew-
art B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act 5 to attempt to
counter this trend by, providing a variety of homeless assis-
* © 1990 by Andrew S. Hughes. The author wishes to thank John Gilroy
and Jim Spano of the California State Department of Education, Wanda C.
McKoin, an attorney in San Jose, California and friend; and Professor Paul
Zarefsky, for their input throughout the writing of this comment; and especially to
my wife, Anita, who through her employment at the Fremont Union High School
District Office, in Sunnyvale, California, was able to make substantive comments
and give me support, without which this comment would not have been possible.
1. Tie term homeless and homelessness will be used in this comment as
meaning an individual without a fixed residence. 42 U.S.C. § 11302 (West Supp.
1988).
2. H.R. REP. No. 10(1), 100th Cong., Ist Sess. 17, reprinted in 1987 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 362, 472.
3. Forcarinis & Ely, Broken Lives: Denial of Education to Homeless Youth, 9
CHILDREN'S LEGAL RTS. J. 1, 2 (1988).
4. Id. at 2.
5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11301-11472 (West Supp. 1988).
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tance programs. The Act's provisions include the creation of
a federal agency charged with implementing and managing
the federal homeless programs. This agency consists of mem-
bers of the Cabinet as well as others,6 and is responsible for
the food and shelter,7 housing assistance,' training,9 educa-
tion"° and community services programs" for the home-
less.
Subchapter VI, part B of the Act which addresses the
problem of education for homeless children, is the subject
of this comment. In part, this section"3 directs those states
which have a residency requirement as part of their compul-
sory education laws to establish procedures to assure public
education is afforded to the children of the homeless.
The basic problem for homeless youth in the public
school system is the question of whether the student "re-
sides" within the district in which he wishes to attend school.
Homeless students can be classified in at least two categories.
First, there are homeless students who live in a temporary
shelter or truly live on the streets and have, through their
parents, the intent to remain in one school district. Second,
there are students who do not remain in any one school
district for any length of time, but must, in any event, be
educated.
In the future it is clear that two conflicts will cause fur-
ther tension in this area, homelessness and educational fund-
6. Id. §§ 11311-11319.
7. Id. §§ 11331-11352.
8. Id. §§ 11361-11394.
9. Id. §§ 11441-11450.
10. Id. §§ 11431-11435.
11. Id. §§ 11461-11472.
12. The author of this comment by no means wishes to deemphasize the
magnitude of the homeless problem in general, specifically the daily need for
many to find food and shelter. The purpose of this comment is only to address a
small portion of the problem, which to those on the street struggling for daily
existence may seem secondary at best.
13. 42 U.S.C. § 11431(2) (West Supp. 1988) provides:
It is the policy of Congress that -
(2) in any State that has a residency requirement as a compo-
nent of its compulsory school attendance laws, the State will review
and undertake steps to revise such laws to assure that the children of
homeless individuals and homeless youth are afforded a free and ap-
propriate public education.
t[Vol. 30
EDUCATING HOMELESS CHILDREN
ing. The first, is the future of homelessness itself. Predictions
for the last decade of this century are grim, if the percentage
of homeless families continues to grow at the present rate
and the problem remains unchecked. It is presently estimated
that "only 43% of school-age homeless children currently
attend school" 4 and that "[o]ut of 29 cities surveyed by the
U.S. Conference of Mayors, 17 reported that homeless chil-
dren were denied access to education."' 5
The second facet of this problem is funding. Educational
funding in California's budget each year is always one of the
most controversial issues, especially because California ranks
below average among other states in educational spending
per student.' 6 Additionally, the education of these children
is costly: the State spends over $3,700 per student per
year.' 7 With the number of homeless growing rapidly,'"
the money to educate the homeless will have to be derived
from some source. 9 The funding of schools will be an issue
not only for the homeless youth, but also for those who have
a fixed residence.
This comment will examine the law in California by ana-
lyzing the residency requirements of the California compulso-
ry education law2" and propose a change to allow for the
14. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 174, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. 93, reprinted in 1987 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 362, 472.
15. Id.
16. U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE U.S. 1988 133
(108th ed. 1987).
17. Id.
18. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 174, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. 93, reprinted in 1987 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEwS 362, 472, which provides, in part: "Washington city
officials reported a 500 percent increase in the number of homeless families seek-
ing shelter just this year."
19. Even though paying for the homeless child's education can be looked at
as an investment in the future, many will be unwilling to invest this money in the
children of a politically inactive group. The homeless not only do not contribute
to the tax base of a school district, but are also a burden on the tax base which
must fund their basic needs such as food and shelter.
20. California's compulsory education law provides:
Each person between the ages of 6 and 18 years not exempted
under the provisions of this chapter or Chapter 3 (commencing with
Section 48400) is subject to compulsory full-time education. Each per-
son subject to compulsory full-time education and each person subject
to compulsory continuation education not exempted under the provi-
sions of Chapter 3 (commencing with Section 48400) shall attend the
public full-time day school or continuation school or classes and for
the full time designated as the length of the schoolday by the govern-
1990] 831
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assimilation of homeless youth into the public school system.
Section II will explore the background of education as a
right by looking briefly at the United States Supreme Court's
analysis and decisions of the California Courts. In addition,
Section II will look to the mandates of the California legisla-
ture regarding public education. Section IV will analyze the
changes in the legislative intent and judicial opinions regard-
ing the attendance in public schools and how the related
concepts of domicile and residence, where one is considered
to live for "legal" purposes, fit into the puzzle. Section V will
present a proposal to change the compulsory education law
to insure that otherwise qualified pupils are not turned away
at the door to the classroom and that the proposal is consis-
tent with California law.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Homelessness
1. The McKinney Act
The McKinney Act is an attempt by Congress to insure
that homeless youth are not denied education simply because
of their status as indigents." Although the Act does not call
specifically for individual state legislation, it does mandate a
"State plan."2 2 This plan insures each homeless youth the
opportunity to attend a public school. The Act calls for a
state-level coordinator to gather data on homeless children,
develop and institute a State plan, and report to the Secre-
ing board of the school district in which the residency of either the parent
or legal guardian is located and each parent, guardian, or other person
having control or charge of the pupil shall send the pupil to the pub-
lic full-time day school or continuation school or classes and for the
full time designated as the length of the schoolday by the governing
board of the school district in which the residence of either the parent or
legal guardian is located.
Unless otherwise provided for in this code, a pupil shall not be
enrolled for less than the minimum schoolday established by law.
CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48200 (Decring 1987 & Stpp. 1990) (emphasis added).
21. See generally H.R. CONF. REP. No. 174, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. 93, reprinted
in 1987 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 362.
22. 42 U.S.C. § 11432(e) (West Supp. 1988).
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tary of Education."3 The State plan allows for procedures to
insure that school districts can no longer turn away a student
due to lack of a fixed residence and that the child shall ei-
ther attend the school in the district the student last attend-
ed, or the district where the youth is now living.24 In addi-
tion, Congress has mandated changes in school district proce-
dure to solve many of the causes contributing to the home-
less not receiving an education, including better accessibility
of school records,25 providing grants to school districts,2"
and other provisions.
Despite the apparently strong substantive protection
Congress has provided for homeless children, it has appropri-
ated only ten dollars per homeless student per year.27 In
view of such facts, it is no surprise that the courts have had
to deal with the denial of public education for homeless
youths since the McKinney Act became law.
2. Judicial Interpretation
The most recent case involving the denial of public edu-
cation to homeless youth is Orozco by Arroyo v. Sobol.28 A stu-
dent asked the court to issue an injunction and decide which
school district he should attend. Although this matter arose
in New York, this case presents an opportunity for compari-
son with California law, because in both states enrollment in
public school is limited by a residency requirement.
9
The two school districts in which the plaintiff wished to
enroll both argued that the plaintiff should not be enrolled
23. Id. at § 11432(c), (d).
24. Id. at § 11432(e)(1), (3).
25. Id. at § 11432(e)(6).
26. Id. at § 11433.
27. Id. at § 11432(g). see supra note 3 and accompanying text.
28. 674 F. Supp. 125 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
29. New York's education law provides in part: "A person over five and
under twenty-one years of age who has not received a high school diploma is
entitled to attend the public schools maintained in the district in which such person
resides . . . ." N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3202(1) (McKinney 1981) (emphasis added). In
Delgado v. Freeport Public School Dist., the court in interpreting the above section
stated that "[t]he cited section has as its purpose the protection of a school dis-
trict from any mandate to educate children who are not residents of the district."
131 Misc. 2d 102, 104, 499 N.Y.S.2d 606, 608 (1986).
For the education law in California, see generally CAL. EDUC. CODE §
48200 (Deering 1987 & Supp. 1990).
1990]
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in their respective districts. The district in which the plaintiff
and her mother were actually residing0  refused to enroll
the child because they did not permanently reside within the
district. The other district refused enrollment because the
plaintiff did not physically live within its boundaries. 1 The
court declined to accept arguments based on traditional legal
concepts such as residency and domicile and instead looked
to the practical solution of having the child attend school in
the district in which the student actually lived.32 The court
deferred to the legislature to formalize a comprehensive solu-
tion to the problem. The legislature, according to the court,
was made aware of this dilemma several years before. 33
Even before the passage of the McKinney Act courts
were deciding the meaning of the phrase the "child's best
interests," which is central to the Act. The "child's best inter-
est" 4 was analyzed in regard to the placement of a home-
less youth within the public school system by a New York
court in 1986,"s in Delgado v. Freeport Public School Dis-
trict.36 The case involved two students who lived in the
Freeport School District and were forced to leave due to
economic conditions "beyond [the student's mother's]
control.""7 For undisclosed reasons, the petitioner wished
to have her two children attend the Freeport schools. She
argued that in fact and in law she was a resident of the
Freeport district. The court summarized the theory of the
plaintiff's argument writing that:
30. The term "residing" is used loosely here. The mother was in an emer-
gency shelter at the time she attempted to enroll the child in school and this
"residence' was not permanent in any way. Delgado, 131 Misc. 2d at 102, 499
N.Y.S.2d at 607.
31. The reason the mother tried to enroll her child in this district (Mount
Vernon) was because of her intent to find a permanent residence there. Id. at
103, 499 N.Y.S.2d at 607.
32. Orozco by Arroyo v. Sobol, 674 F. Supp. 125, 133. (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
33. Id. at 130.
34. 42 U.S.C. § 11432(e)(3) (West Supp. 1988).
35. This comment is not meant to be an exhaustive treatment of New York
law and the cases presented here are for comparison only.
36. 131 Misc. 2d 102, 499 N.Y.S.2d 606 (1986).
37. Id. The petitioner ultimately resided in a temporary shelter in the Roose-
velt District, but a condition of living in the shelter was to "spend the daytime
hours away from such premises and in search of permanent housing." Apparently,
the residence of the petitioner would not remain the same for any length of time
and was the primary concern of the Roosevelt School District's Administration. Id.
at 102, 499 N.Y.S.2d at 607.
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one does not change residency unless the intention to
make a change is manifested. Absent such intention, it is
argued, the last residency and all the rights that attach to
it must prevail, and that includes the right to public
education at schools within the district of such 'retained'
residency.'
However, the court gave little deference to this argu-
ment and found that the child's best interest would be to
attend the school in the district where she actually resided,
even though temporary, and not the district of original atten-
dance or preference.3 0 The court gave no consideration to
the arguments that the child may soon move to a new resi-
dence or that the lack of continuity in the youth's education
would be unnecessarily disruptive. 0
B. Compulsory Education Law
1. Federal Law
The United States Supreme Court has had numerous
opportunities to analyze the status of compulsory education
and related laws of various states. The Court's analysis of
education-related laws is, for the most part, limited to an
equal protection analysis.
In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez4" a
group of parents challenged the propriety of the method
used by Texas to finance public schools.4" The Court wrote
that "[e]ducation, of course, is not among the rights afforded
explicit protection under our Federal Constitution. Nor do
we find any basis for saying it is implicitly so protected.""
The court clearly rejected the idea that the right to educa-
tion is protected by the Federal Constitution as a
"fundamental"4 4 right, but explicitly accepted the premise
38. Id.
39. Id. at 104-05, 499 N.Y.S.2d at 608..
40. Id.
41. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
42. In this case, the plaintiffs were using, among others, equal protection ar-
guments for die protection of a fundamental right, education. Id.
43. Id. at 35.
44. As one of their arguments, the plaintiffs contended that education should
1990)
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from Brown v. Board of Education45 that "education is per-
haps the most important function of state and local govern-
ments"."
More recently, in Plyler v. Doe,47 the United States Su-
preme Court analyzed the right of the children of illegal
aliens to attend public schools." Reiterating their opinion
in Rodriguez, the Court held that although public education is
not a constitutional right, it is not "merely some governmen-
tal 'benefit' indistinguishable from other forms of social
welfare legislation. Both the importance of education in
maintaining our basic institutions, and the lasting impact of
its deprivation on the life of the child, mark the distinc-
tion."49 As in Rodriguez, the Court examined the equal pro-
tection status of children of illegal aliens vis-a-vis the right to
attend public school. The Court ultimately held that there
was no legitimate state interest in excluding the children of
illegal aliens from public school and, therefore, the State was
prohibited from doing so.5
0
Before Plyler was decided, a factually similar case came
before the California Court of Appeals for the Second Dis-
trict, which was decided contrary to Plyler. Although not
expressly overruled, Anselmo v. Glendale Unified School Dis-
trict5 is clearly overruled sub silentio5" by Plyler.5" Anselmo
concerned the denial of admittance to a public school of a
student whose parents resided in the United States through
be a fundamental right protected by the Constitution because it is necessary to
utilize other fundamental rights, such as voting. However, the Court noted that
"the right to vote, per se, is not a constitutionally protected right . . . [but that
the right] to participate in state elections on an equal basis with other qualified
voters" is a protected right. Id. n.78.
45. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
46. Id. at 493.
47. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
48. As with illegal aliens, the homeless are not considered legal residents of
the school district. However, the homeless are usually residents of the state and
should be entitled to rights such as education at least on par with illegal aliens.
49. Plyer, 457 U.S. at 221.
50. Id. at 230.
51. 124 Cal. App. 3d 520, 177 Cal. Rptr. 427 (1981).
52. Sub silentio is defined as "[u]nder silence; without any notice being taken".
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1280 (5th ed. 1979).
53. Anselmo is clearly overruled by Plyler because the rationale upon which
both decisions are based are similar. Additionally, no reasonable distinction exists
in applying an equal protection analysis to illegal aliens as in Plyler and not to the
legal aliens in Anselmo.
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non-immigrant visas. The parents purchased a house in Cali-
fornia and subsequently attempted to enroll their child in
public school. The court did not allow the child to enroll in
school because he did not "reside" in the district. 4 Al-
though Anselmo is no longer valid, its importance is in recog-
nizing the trend in the interpretation of California law of
residency and the central role the residency requirement
plays in the compulsory education law. Although Plyler seems
to mandate education regardless of residency status, the deci-
sion in Orozco by Arroyo v. Sobol 5 indicates that there are
still issues of education for the homeless yet to be resolved.
2. California's Compulsory Education Law
In Piper v. Big Pine School District,56 the California Su-
preme Court aptly stated that "[t]he education of the chil-
dren of the state is an obligation which the state took over
to itself by the adoption of the Constitution."57 The Califor-
nia Constitution provides:
A general diffusion of knowledge and intelligence being
essential to the preservation of the rights and liberties of
the people, the Legislature shall encourage by all suitable
means the promotion of intellectual, scientific, moral,
and agricultural improvement.m
However, when this section was adopted at the time of state-
hood, there was no reason to provide for the homeless prob-
lem. Even a cursory reading of this section implies that
homeless children should be educated and that strong public
policy reasons support this position.
The problem concerning the homeless is not whether
they should attend school, but where they shall attend. Each
district is a quasi-autonomous public body responsible for
educating the youth of its district. But in the case of the
homeless, they live within no particular school district. This
concept of attending school in the district of residence is as
old as the state itself. The California Constitution provides
54. Anselmo, 124 Cal. App. 3d at 523, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 428-29.
55. 674 F. Supp. 125 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). See supra notes 28-33 and accompany-
ing text.
56. 193 Cal. 664, 226 P. 926 (1924).
57. Id. at 669, 226 P. at 928.
58. CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 1.
8371990]
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that:
The Legislature shall provide for a system of common
schools by which a free school shall be kept up and sup-
ported in each district at least six months in every year,
after the first year in which a school has been estab-
lished.'
There has never been a provision in the education code for
the residential determination of the homeless. However, the
case law continually speaks to specific districts of school at-
tendance as an integral part of the educational scheme in
California. In Ward v. Flood,6" the court noted that students
must attend the school "nearest their residence.""' And in
Piper v. Big Pine School District,62 the court quotes the rele-
vant code63 as to the education of California's youth hold-
ing that "each school district of California shall be open for
the admission of all children between six and twenty-one
years of age residing within the boundaries of the district."64
Although the United States Supreme Court held that the
right to education is not a fundamental right under the Fed-
eral Constitution,65 California courts have held that educa-
tion is a fundamental right under the California Constitution.
In Slayton v. Pomona Unifled School District,66 the court holds,
based on Article IX, sections 1 and 5 of the California Con-
stitution,67 that "California has extended the right to an edu-
cation"" and the right is clearly fundamental. 9 Ward con-
cerned the right of a student to attend a public, but segre-
gated school, and was quoted in Slayton. The court wrote
that the right to attend public school is a right:
59. CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 5 (emphasis added).
60. 48 Cal. 36 (1874).
61. Id. at 44.
62. 193 Cal. 664, 226 P. 926 (1924). This case was very similar to Ward,
except that Piper dealt with an Indian child who wished to attend public school
instead of a black child. Id.
63. At this point in time, the relevant code section was section 1662 of the
California Political Code, subdivisions (2) and (3).
64. CAL. POL. CODE § 1662 (Deering 1922) (emphasis added).
65. See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
66. 161 Cal. App. 3d 538, 207 Cal. Rptr. 705 (1984).
67. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
68. 161 Cal. App. 3d at 548, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 711 (emphasis in original).
69. Slayton, Id.
838 [Vol. 30
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derived and secured to [each child] under the highest
sanction of positive law. It is, therefore, a right - a legal
right - as distinctively so as the vested right in property
owned is a legal right, and as such it is protected, and
entitled to be protected by all guarantees by which other
legal rights are protected and secured to the possess-
or.
70
If it is unquestionable that the right to an education is
to be protected as any other vested legal right in California,
it leaves unanswered why so many homeless children, who
desire an education, are not eligible to attend school. The
California Department of Education has recognized the prob-
lem of the homeless being denied admission to public
schools writing that "[a]s the residency law is typically applied
[in California], if the parents cannot provide proof of a
street address within the district, the child is denied admis-
sion. "71
3. Education Code Section 48200
The Compulsory Education Law of California has experi-
enced many legislative changes in the residency requirement
and the interpretation since inception.72 In 1955, the law
was amended 7- to change the word "resides" to the word
"lives."74 However, it was the opinion of the California At-
torney General that "[n]o substantive change was made by
the amendments."
75
Specifically, the California Attorney General's office,
70. Ward, 48 Cal. at 50.
71. Application of the Residency Requirements for Homeless Children and Youth,
CAL. ST. DEP'T. OF EDUC., Legal Opinion No. 5-88, at 2.
72. The main provision of this section mandates that each child shall attend
ftill-time day school. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48200 (Deering 1987 & Supp. 1990).
73. Id. § 16601 (Deering 1955 & Supp 1959).
74. Section 16601 of the Education Code, after the 1955 amendment read:
Each parent, guardian, or other person having control or charge of
any child between the ages of 8 and 16 years, not exempted under
the provisions of this chapter, shall send the child to the public
full-time day school for the full time for which the public schools of
the city, city and county, or school district in which the child lives are in
session.
26 Op. Att'y Gen. 269, 270 (1955) (quoting CAL. EDUC. CODE § 16601) (Deering
1955 & Supp. 1959)) (emphasis added).
75. Id.
8391990)
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wrote that the "action of the Legislature in changing 'reside'
to 'live' confirms our previous interpretation that 'reside'
was not used in the meaning of 'domicile' as defined by
Government Code section 244. " " The Attorney General
previously interpreted the word "reside," as used in the com-
pulsory education law, "to mean the place where the school
child is actually living without regard to the legal residence
or domicile of his parents unless he resides in the district for
the sole purpose of attending the schools of the district."77
In 1987, the California Legislature removed from the
compulsory education law the reference to Welfare and Insti-
tutions Code section 17.1. Therefore, one must now look to
the residency of the parent in order to determine the school
district which the child should attend. Section 244 of the
Government Code states that the domicile of a minor is the
same as the parent. Therefore, the finding of domicile and
residency of the student's parent is now determinative. Fur-
ther, since there are no exceptions to the residency re-
quirement which apply to homeless youth,78 a conflict exists
between the incompatible compulsory education requirement,
which requires that the student attend full-time school, and
the residency requirement, which requires that the student
only attend the school in the district where they live. Thus,
there exists a need for reconciliation.
C. Residency and Domicile
The concepts of domicile and residence are often con-
fused as the same idea and repeatedly used interchangeably.
However, these concepts have different legal meanings. The
California Supreme Court has recognized the difference be-
tween domicile and residence stating that "'[d]omicile' is
normally a more comprehensive term, in that it includes
both the act of residence and an intention to remain."79 It is
widely accepted that an individual may have more than one
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Section 48204 of the California Education Code provides. exceptions to
the residency requirements for school attendance in a school district regardless of
actual residence. However, no exception is applicable to the problem at hand.
CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48204 (Deering 1989 & Supp. 1990).
79. Smith v. Smith, 45 Cal. 2d 235, 239, 288 P.2d 497, 499 (1955) (emphasis
in original).
[Vol. 30840
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residence, but only one domicile at any one time."0
The state of the law in California is such that "[e]very
person has, in law, a residence."8' Although domicile" is a
common law concept, the statutes, in referring to resi-
dence,83 are in actuality referring to domicile. Residence is
determined by Government Code section 244.4 In Govern-
ment Code sections 243 and 244, the term "residence" has
been determined to be "used ... synonymous[ly] with do-
80. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 244 (Deering 1982); see also Smith, 45 Cal. 2d at 239,
288 P.2d at 499.
81. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 243 (Deering 1982).
82. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 435 (5th ed. 1979) defines domicile as "[tihat
place where a man has his true, fixed, and permanent home and principle estab-
lishment, and to which whenever he is absent lie has an intention of returning."
83. Residence is defined as:
Personal presence at some place of abode with no present intention
of definite and early removal and with purpose to remain for unde-
termined period, not infrequently, but not necessarily combined with
design to stay permanently . . . . As "domicile" and "residence" are
usually in the same place, they are frequently used as if they had the
same meaning, but they are not identical terms, for a person may
have two places of residence, as in the city and country, but only one
domicile. Residence means living in a particular locality, but domicile
means living in that locality with the intent to make it a fixed and
permanent home. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an
inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in
that place and also an intention to make it one's domicile.
d. 1176-77.
84. Government Code section 244, entitled "Determination of place of resi-
dence," provides:
In determining the place of residence the following rules shall be
observed:
(a) It is the place where one remains when not called elsewhere for
labor or other special or temporary purpose, and to which he or she
returns in seasons of repose.
(b) There can only be one residence.
(c)'A residence cannot be lost until another is gained.
(d) The residence of the parent with whom an unmarried minor child
maintains his or her place of abode is the residence of such unmar-
ried minor child.
(e) The residence of an unmarried minor who has a parent living
cannot be changed by his or her own act.
(f) The residence can be changed only by the union of act and in-
tent.
(g) A married person shall have the right to retain his or her legal
residence in the State of California notwithstanding the legal resi-
dence or domicile of his or her spouse.
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 244 (Deering 1982).
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micile." 5 For the purposes of this comment the term
'residence' will connote the meaning of a fixed place of resi-
dence with the intention to remain. 6
1. Residency Generally in the Law
"The question of residence or domicile is a mixed ques-
tion of law and fact . . . ." However, what constitutes resi-
dence is very often different depending on the area of law
for which residence needs to be established. In 1947, the
California Court of Appeals for the First District attempted
to establish the concept of residency under the California
Vehicle Code in Briggs v. Superior Court."8 There was no
case law on point and little statutory authority. The court in
discussing this point wrote that:
[r]esidence, as used in the law, is a most elusive and
indefinite term. It has been variously defined, and means
one thing under the attachment laws, another under the
voting laws, and still another under the venue laws ...
To determine its meaning, it is necessary to consider the
purpose of the act.'
The court had to shape a new definition with respect to
residency in order to effectuate the purpose of the statute.
Although the case law developed around the concept
that each area of law has different requirements for determi-
nation of residency, there are common threads which run
through all areas of the law of residency. Generally, in Cali-
fornia, "'[t]o establish a domicile, two things are necessary:
(1) the taking up of a physical or actual residence in a partic-
ular place, and (2) the intent to make it a permanent abode.
Union of act and intent is essential; and until such union
occurs, one retains his former domicile."'90 This concept of
85. Smith, 45 Cal. 2d at 239, 288 P.2d at 499.
86. For the purposes of this comment and the homeless problem in general,
there is little reason to consider the problem of having two residences and only
one domicile.
87. In re Estate of Phillips, 269 Cal. App. 2d 656, 659, 75 Cal. Rptr. 301,
303 (1969).
88. 81 Cal. App. 2d 240, 183 P.2d 758 (1947).
89. Id. at 245, 183 P.2d at 762.
90. Chapman v. Superior Court, 162 Cal. App. 2d 421, 426, 328 P.2d 23, 26
(1958) (quoting 16 CAL. JUR. 2d, § 4, 649).
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retention of former domicile is especially important in the
consideration of the plight of the homeless.
As the homeless problem grows, more cases are reaching
the courts which are defining the rights of these individuals.
In Nelson v. Board of Supervisors of San Diego,9 a group of
homeless individuals brought an action against the county for
withholding general relief payments because they lacked a
fixed, residential address. In a footnote, the court wrote that
"[t]he County cites no authority suggesting a dwelling address
is an element of residence under California law .... Under
Adkins, a dwelling address is at most only an objective criteri-
on of residence, not an element of residence itself."92 Al-
though the court found a dwelling address was not necessary,
an individual still must establish a legal residence within the
county.
93
The question of whether it is necessary to have an actual
dwelling address has not been answered for most inquiries
into the residence question. Clearly, in Nelson the scope of
the welfare-type benefits was the relief for the economic dis-
tress of the indigents. It follows that many indigents are un-
able to afford a dwelling address, and that, therefore, the
court should insure that those lacking a residence are not
precluded from realizing a state benefit directed towards
them. On the other hand, the majority of those who attend
public school have a residential address, wealth not being a
factor per se in the attendance of public school. The ques-
tion remaining is whether the California Education Code's
residency requirement necessitates a dwelling address.
2. School District of Residence
The focus of this comment is the concept of the school
district and how it interacts with the concept of residency,
which combine to establish eligibility of attendance. But is it
important what school district a student attends? In theory,
no; however, in reality it is important to many that the con-
91. 190 Cal. App. 3d 25, 235 Cal. Rptr. 305 (1987).
92. Id. at 30, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 309, refering to Adkins v. Leach, 17 Cal. App.
3d 771, 95 Cal. Rptr. 61 (1971).
93. A homeless individual may legally reside within one county, never leaving
it and having the intention to stay within its boundaries, however, that same
person may "sleep" in a different school district nightly.
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trol over schools be retained on a local basis, a strong rela-
tionship be maintained with the immediate community, and
there be continuity in attendance patterns. Therefore, the
school attended by the student is of great concern. 4In Laton Joint Union High School District v. Armstead,"
the court analyzed the question of whether or not a school
district had a valuable interest in the attendance of pupils
residing within the district to attend its schools. The court,
in examining the financial support system of the school dis-
trict, based on the, attendance of students, wrote that "[i]t
must necessarily follow then that the school district of resi-
dence has a valuable interest in the attendance of pupils
residing within it.""6
California courts, in making decisions on collateral mat-
ters to residency, note the importance of the district of resi-
dence concept. In deciding the nature of the funding system
of public schools via local property taxes in Serrano v.
Pries497 the California Supreme Court noted that "education
is so important that the state has made it compulsory - not
only in the requirement of attendance but also by assignment
to a particular district and school."98 The integrity of the
residency requirements in the school district system is firmly
established. But as the homeless problem becomes more evi-
dent in California, the courts have been following "[t]he
most fundamental [rule,] . . . that the court should ascertain
the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose
of the law"99 which is to insure that the homeless are given
every benefit the legislature intended. It is clear that the
intent of Education Code section 48200 is to educate all of
the state's youth, without regard to a fixed residence.
3. Voting as an Analogy to Education
94. In the 1970s, many school districts were ordered by courts to desegregate
themselves because of the clear separation of the races at schools within the
district. At that time it was clearly important to many vocal parents who attended
what school.
95. 130 Cal. App. 628, 20 P.2d 757 (1933).
96. Id. at 631, 20 P.2d at 758.
97. 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
98. Id. at 610, 487 P.2d at 1259, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 619.
99. Walters v. Weed, 45 Cal. 3d 1, 9, 752 P.2d 443, 447, 246 Cal. Rptr. 5, 9
(1988) (citation omitted).
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Residency requirements for voting provide an appropri-
ate analogy to the residency requirement in the compulsory
education law. There are many similarities between the vot-
ing and the compulsory education residency requirements. In
the Serrano case, the court wrote that "[t]he analogy between
education and voting is much more direct: both are crucial
to participation in, and the functioning of, a democracy.
Voting has been regarded as a fundamental right because it
is 'preservative of other basic civil and political rights.'"'0 0
There are other similarities: unlike other forms of residency
requirements, such as venue, attachment, and probate pro-
ceedings, voting and education residency requirements are
part of everyday life. Venue, attachment, and probate pro-
ceedings arise only in the context of litigation. By compari-
son, venue is no more specific than the county of residence,
while both voting and education are tied to areas as small as
a few city blocks.
Finally, a voting analogy is appropriate because "voting
registration is '[o]ne of the important acts to be considered'
in determining residence [domicile]."'0 ' Many cases, in de-
termining whether the intent necessary to change residence
exists, look to where the questioned individual is registered
to vote.
102
To date, only one case has dealt with the issue of the
homeless and their right to vote in California. Collier v.
Menzelo's involved three individuals who considered them-
selves "homeless" and who were denied the right to vote by
the County of Santa Barbara. The three listed on their voter
residence affidavits the address of a city park where they
100. Serrano, 5 Cal. 3d at 607-08, 487 P.2d at 1258, 96 Cal. Rptr at 618
(quoting Reynolds v. Sims 377 U.S. 533 (1964)).
101. Johnson v. Johnson, 245 Cal. App. 2d 40, 44, 53 Cal. Rptr. 567, 570
(1966) (citation omitted) (quoting Cothran v. Town Council, 209 Cal. App. 2d
647, 26 Cal. Rptr. 319 (1962)).
102. See generally Percy v. Percy, 188 Cal. 765, 207 P. 369 (1922); In re
Thornton, 135 Cal. App. 3d 500, 185 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1982) (using voting registra-
tion to determine residency for purposes of divorce); Bullis v. Staniford, 178 Cal.
40, 171 P. 1064 (1918) (using voting registration for purposes of determining the
validity of a declaration of homestead); Cothran, 209 Cal. App. 2d 647, 26 Cal.
Rptr. 319 (1962) (using voting registration for the purpose of terminating annex-
ation proceedings).
103. 176 Cal. App. 3d 24, 221 Cal. Rptr. 110 (1985); see also Note, Collier v.
Menze" Home Sweet Park-The Homeless Win the Right to Vote, 13 W. ST. U.L. REv.
629 (1986).
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claimed to reside. °4 The County informed the plaintiffs
that the address listed was insufficient and if the plaintiffs so
desired they could register in the precincts of their former
residences until the establishment of a new one. The plain-
tiffs asserted that "California law does not require that a
voter registrant live in an actual building." °5 The court
found that this view was supported by state law. 16
The only requirement in question was the need of a
fixed habitation, because normally the homeless are not con-
sidered to be fixed in residential location as compared to
one who owns or rents residential real estate. The court
stretched this interpretation, using the dictionary definition
of "habitation," and found that "[a] dwelling or shelter is a
subjective term since it can mean entirely different things to
different people."'0 7 The court used the Legislature's provi-
sion for establishing a residence in a trailer or other vehicle
to infer that there is no need for a "fixed" habitation.'0 8
Obviously, implicit in the notion of a vehicle is mobility.
However, the types of vehicles that this section covers are
vehicles that, for instance, require special hook-ups in order
to emulate a home and make the subjective definition of
"habitation" much narrower than the court's interpretation.
The defendant County argued that the plaintiffs still had
a right to vote considering that the homeless were entitled to
vote in their last established domicile. But, as in the case of
homeless children, requiring voters, or students, to travel a
substantial distance to exercise their rights would be unneces-
sarily restrictive, and this solution was found to be unaccept-
able by the court.'0 9
There was no reason presented to the court to deny the
plaintiffs the right to vote in the area where they chose to
live. It makes no difference in educational residency or resi-
dency for voting purposes "whether people 'sleep under a
104. Collier, 176 Cal. App. 3d at 29, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 111.
105. Id. at 30, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 112.
106. Id. at 37, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 116.
107. Id. at 31, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 112.
108. "Residence in a trailer or vehicle or at any public camp or camping
ground may constitute a domicile for voting purposes if the registrant complies
with the other requirements of this article." CAL. ELEC. CODE § 207 (Deering
1977).
109. Collier, 176 Cal. App. 3d at 33, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 114.
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bush or a tree or in the open air . . . ,""0 since there is
clearly no rational link between where individuals sleep and
their right to vote or receive an education. Therefore, the
court held that the plaintiffs would be eligible to vote using
the address of the city-owned park, noting that "[ilt is patent-
ly unjust that society ignores the homeless and yet also de-
nies them the proper [political] avenues to remedy the situa-
tion.""' As with the homeless youth of California, without
a proper education to establish even minimal competency,
they will not only be unable to remedy their personal situa-
tion, but will be forced to continue on the welfare rolls of
the state.
More recently, the California Supreme Court analyzed
voter domicile in the context of a contested election in Santa
Cruz County in Walters v. Weed." 2 The case presented the
question of whether those who leave their domicile with no
intention of returning, lose their right to vote in that domi-
cile even though they fail to establish a new one. However,
for many homeless, the rationale behind the Walters holding
applies by analogy. The Court held:
that when a person leaves his or her -domicile with the
intention to abandon it, and when that person currently
resides in a place in which he or she does not intend to
remain, that person may vote in the precinct of his or
her former domicile until a new domicile has been ac-
quired." 3
The holding in that case was proclaimed to be narrow in
scope," 4 so its potential of bearing on the plight of the
homeless could be limited. However, the rationale behind the
case is important. For the majority of homeless, where they
"currently reside" is not a place where they intend to remain.
Although this holding does not explicitly apply to educational
residency requirements, the holding does suggest that courts
might be willing to insure that the compulsory education law
is enforced and that at least some options, including attend-
110. Id. at 35, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 115.
111. Id. at 36, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 116.
112. 45 Cal. 3d 1, 752 P.2d 443, 246 Cal. Rptr. 5 (1988).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 14, 752 P.2d at 451, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 13.
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ing school in their prior district, are available.
When the residency requirements for voting are
analogized to the residency requirements of the compulsory
education law it is apparent that the trend in the law is to
assist the homeless in exercising their rights as citizens of
California and that even those citizens who lack a fixed resi-
dence will be protected by the courts.
III. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
California's compulsory education law unfairly limits
access to education. Youth who are otherwise entitled to
attend public schools in this state are denied this opportunity
because they lack a fixed residence. This lack of a street
address should not be sufficient to rob these children of an
opportunity to be educated.
A. Impact of the Problem
The homeless youth have been thrown involuntarily into
a cycle of poverty that is destined to perpetuate itself. There-
fore, the impact on homeless youth of the denial of educa-
tion is perhaps more detrimental than to the youth of any
other socio-economic class. Furthermore, homeless families
are not afforded the luxury of planning their child's educa-
tional future. Indeed, the parents of homeless children are
concerned with significantly more pressing problems. The
homeless youth have a clear need to be educated in order to
stop the cycle they are trapped within.
B. The Necessity of an Easy Solution
The problem can be reduced to one statement: homeless
youth, who in many ways have the greatest need for educa-
tion, are being denied access to education because of prob-
lems in the law.
The goal of assuring that homeless students can be easily
assimilated into the educational system will not be an easy
one to meet. The problems of registering in a particular
school is the major obstacle faced by the homeless. Everyone
agrees that the homeless should be educated, but no one
agrees on where this should occur. The longer these children
are deprived of an education, the damage suffered increases
proportionally. However, there are only limited resources
848 [Vol. 30
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available to provide the answers. Those searching for solu-
tions to the problem of enrolling these youth in school, must
also be concerned with transportation of the homeless to
school, the continuity of education, the level of education,
and the content of that education. But above all, a simple
solution that can be easily adopted and administered is re-
quired, because as the burden to register the homeless for
school increases, the number of those attempting to enroll
will decrease.
IV. ANALYSIS
The McKinney Act is a good beginning to the solution
of the homeless education problem, but it is only a begin-
ning. This federal legislation leaves open many alternatives to
the states for individual tailoring of the Act, provided that
the goal of educating the homeless youth is met. Because of
the unlimited number of options available to the state, Cali-
fornia should conform their homeless youth education solu-
tion to maintain conformity with present state law, as set out
in Section V, the proposal section, of this comment.
A. Changes in the Residency Requirements of Education Code
Section 48200
The two major questions concerning the residency re-
quirement of the compulsory education law are: (1) is it the
minor's or the parent's residence which ultimately determines
the district of attendance, and (2) will residence be defined
as living in a fixed residence or will simply living "on the
streets" of that district suffice?
In 1976, when section 48200 was enacted, the provisions
for determining residence were essentially unchanged from
the previous compulsory education law. Prior to 1976, one
looked to the place where the "child lives."" 5 After 1976,
one looked to Welfare and Institutions Code section 17.1116
115. See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
116. Section 17.1 of the Welfare and Institutions Code is entitled "Determina-
tion of minor's residence" and provides in relevant part: "Unless otherwise provid-
ed under the provisions of this code, to the extent not in conflict with federal
law, the residence of a minor person shall be determined by the following rules:
(a) The residence of the parent with whom a child maintains his or her place of
abode . . . determines the residence of the child." CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §
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which provided that in the majority of cases the minor's legal
residence would be that of the parent. In most cases, there is
little difficulty in determining the residency requirement;
when the child lives with the parent the school that the child
is to attend is easily ascertainable. The change in 1976 is of
little concern to the majority of the school-age population,
because most children live and attend school where their
parents live.
With the passage of the 1987 amendment to the compul-
sory education law," 7 the conclusion of the California At-
torney General that no substantial change in the residency
requirement was effectuated is no longer valid.' However,
the present version"' of the law focuses on the "school dis-
trict in which the residency of either the parent or legal
guardian is located" and, in consideration of the 1987
amendment, the residence of the minor child appears insig-
nificant. The statute no longer refers to the child individually
and, in 1987, the legislature purposely removed all reference
to the residential determination of the minor. Thus, Govern-
ment Code section 244 is the only statutory reference re-
maining in which to interpret section 48200.
B. Domicile and Residence
The concept of "domicile" was used in many of the cas-
17.1 (Deering 1988).
There has been very little judicial interpretation of this section: Sampsell v.
Superior Court, 32 Cal. 2d 763, 774, 197 P.2d 739, 746-47 (1948) (determining if
California had jurisdiction over a custody battle); In re Alexander, 152 Cal. App.
2d 458, 460, 313 P.2d 182, 183 (1957) (determining the residence of children
without parents); In re Grimmer, 259 Cal. App. 2d 840, 842-44, 66 Cal. Rptr. 816,
817-18 (1968) (determining which county shall bear the cost of wardship proceed-
ings); In re Ramona S., 64 Cal. App. 3d 945, 949-52, 134 Cal. Rptr. 881, 883-84
(1976) (determining where wardship proceeding should be held); In re Eleanor A.,
84 Cal. App. 3d 184, 187-91, 148 Cal. Rptr. 315, 317-19 (1978) (determining
where wardship proceeding should be held); Anselmo v. Glendale Unified School
Dist., 124 Cal. App. 3d 520, 522, 177 Cal. Rptr. 427, 428 (1981) (determining the
residence of nonimmigrant visa holding student who wished to attend public
school).
117. In 1987, the California legislature deleted the last sentence of Education
Code section 48200 which read: "Residency, for the purpose of attendance in
public schools, shall be determined by Section 17.1 of the Welfare and Institutions
Code." CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48200 (Deering 1987 & Supp. 1990).
118. See supn note 73 and accompanying text.
119. See supra note 20.
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es cited in Section II of this comment. These decisions form
the basis of the common law in California on the subject of
educating the homeless children. Focusing mainly on Califor-
nia cases, this subsection of this comment will analyze the
court's rationales in the interpretation of the residency re-
quirements of California law.
The court in Orozco by Arroyo v. Sobol"2° stated that the
"traditional legal concepts" of domicile and residence are
ineffective in making a judicial decision with regard to plac-
ing the homeless in public schools.' The Orozco case dealt
only with a short-term solution to the homeless youth prob-
lem and for only one individual student. However, a
long-term solution to the problem of educating the homeless
youth population of California requires the use of established
legal concepts in order to avoid inconsistent determinations
in the placement of homeless students in public schools.
The establishment of a domicile requires the union of
act and intent. However, a question arises as to how to
apply these concepts to homeless individuals. In the case of
an individual or family being evicted from a home, the prior
residents clearly have no intent to return. No matter how far
these homeless individuals move from their previous resi-
dence, they are technically still domiciled in that previous
place. Rights based upon State law which depend on place of
residence, such as school of attendance, are greatly affected.
Is the homeless person's former domicile retained in the
previous district or does it follow the individual for the pur-
pose of school attendance?
The interpretation of the Nelson123 rationale is easily
distinguishable from the homeless education problem. The
case dealt with the distribution of welfare-type benefits and
not residency for the purposes of school attendance. There is
considerable difference in establishing the residence of an
individual in a county versus residence in a school district
because the area covered by a school district is usually more
limited in scope than an entire county and therefore the
Nelson holding will not apply to the homeless education prob-
120. 674 F. Supp. 125. 131 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
121. See supra notes 28-33 and accompanying text.
122. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
123. See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
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lem. The implication of Nelson is that homeless youth may be
unable to define their residency specifically enough to entitle
them to attend a particular school.
The homeless are often forced to relocate to temporary
residences such as temporary shelters or even sleeping on
the streets. Thus, the issue to be resolved is whether a new
domicile has been acquired.
The court in DeYoung v. DeYoung'24 wrote that "[t]he
acquisition of a new domicile is generally understood to re-
quire an actual change of residence accompanied by the
intention to remain either permanently or for an indefinite
time without any fixed or certain purpose to return to the former
place of abode."'25 Homeless people do not meet the first
part of this definition; there is no actual change in residence.
The homeless by definition are without a home. However,
the homeless are leaving their previous residences without
the purpose of returning and thus meet the second part of
the definition. The homeless will be unable to send their
children to school without establishing a new domicile or
residence if this residency concept as currently defined is
kept in the compulsory education law.
The definition used in the In re Estate of Glassford"2 '
furthers this concept that the domicile of the homeless does
not follow them to where they reside. The court stated:
"[t]he judicial concept of domicile is essentially equivalent to
the lay idea of home. [citation] It embodies a disposition
towards permanence, an attitude of attachment."' 27 The
court conveniently defined domicile as a home. Although for
the most part this holds true, for the homeless it only hin-
ders the exercise of their right to education. This definition
does not allow the homeless to exercise their rights which
are residence specific. If this definition remains viable the
homeless will lose rights to which they are clearly entitled.
In 1985 case of Collier v. Menzel,' the court noted
that "there is no statutory authority for the position that a
residence cannot be a place where there are no living facili-
124. 27 Cal. 2d 521, 165 P.2d 457 (1946).
125. Id. at 524, 165 P.2d at 458 (emphasis added).
126. In rm Estate of Glassford, 114 Cal. App. 2d 181, 249 P.2d 908 (1952).
127. Id. at 186, 249 P.2d at 911.
128. 176 Cal. App. 3d 24, 221 Cal. Rptr. 110 (1985).
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ties. " 1 9 It is this developing line of cases that will allow the
homeless to exercise their rights. Although most of the domi-
cile and residence specific statutes refer to a home or fixed
residential structure, these cases signal a change in the atti-
tudes of the judiciary. Judges are now more willing to con-
strue residence to allow the homeless the rights they are
entitled to. The next step in solving the problem of insuring
that the homeless can exercise their right to public education
is to change the definitions in the law.
C. A Private Cause of Action
If the proposal presented in the next section is not
adopted and the homeless youth is prevented from attending
public school, one answer would be to file a private cause of
action. In 1975, the United States Supreme Court decided
the landmark case of Cort v. Ash 3 ' which established the
test for implying private causes of action in federal statutes.
As presented in Cort the plaintiff had to satisfy a four factor
test. The first factor questioned "is the plaintiff 'one of the
class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted' . . .
that is, does the statute create a federal right in favor of the
plaintiff." 3 ' It is clear from the McKinney Act and its legis-
lative history that the statute was, in part, designed to benefit
homeless youth who are denied access to public education.
The aim of the statute is to insure that the largest number
of homeless youth are educated and that no state regulations
hinder this goal. There is no question that the McKinney Act
was enacted for the especial benefit of the homeless.
"Second, is there any indication of legislative intent,
explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or deny
one?" "'32 There is no express indication in the statute or
legislative history as to a private cause of action. However,
some courts "have placed considerable emphasis upon the
desirability of implying private rights of action in order to
provide remedies thought to effectuate the purposes of a
given statute . . . what must ultimately be determined is
129. Id. at 35, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 115.
130. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
131. Id. at 78 (emphasis in original) (quoting Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v.
Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39 (1916)).
132. Id.
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whether Congress intended to create the private remedy as-
serted. " 'S But this "does not mean that [the Supreme
Court] require[s] evidence that Members of Congress...
actually had in mind the creation of a private cause of ac-
tion." 4 Finding an implicit indication of Congressional in-
tent is difficult. Congress provided that the homeless youth
will be educated in public schools and there are no excep-
tions to this Congressional mandate. However, there are no
provisions for enforcement in states which fail to implement
such a program. Since the McKinney Act provides only ten
dollars per homeless student per year 3 5 there is little in-
centive for the state to educate the homeless. Therefore,
Congress probably implied a private cause of action so that a
youth denied access to education could sue the state in or-
der to estalish her right to a public education.
"Third, is it consistent with the underlying purposes of
the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the
plaintiff?"" 6 "While a private remedy will not be implied to
the frustration of the legislative purpose, 'when that remedy
is necessary or at least helpful to the accomplishment of the
statutory purpose, the Court is decidedly receptive to its
implication under the statute.'"" 7 As mentioned above
there is no incentive to the individual states to implement
the homeless education programs. It is entirely consistent
with and helpful to the implementation of the legislative
intent of the McKinney Act for individuals to prosecute ac-
tions to allow them admission to public schools. If the Court
allows private actions in these types of matters, the purpose
of Congress to ensure the education of homeless youth will
be furthered.
The fourth factor relates to whether "the cause of action
[is] one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basical-
ly the concern of the States, so that it would be inappropri-
ate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal
law." ' Traditionally, education has been in the realm of
133. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15-16 (1979).
134. Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 179 (1988).
135. See supra notes 3, 26 and accompanying text.
136. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
137. Transamerica, 444 U.S. at 34 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting Cannon v.
University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 703 (1979)).
138. Cott, 422 U.S. at 78. (1975).
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state regulation. However, the federal government has always
had the right to intervene into the actions of states. There is
no reason to allow the states to exclude the homeless from
public education. Therefore, this element of the four-part
Cort test, along with the other three prongs tends to support
the finding of a private cause of action for the homeless
youth.
However, there has been a trend by the United States
Supreme Court to limit the finding of a private cause of
action. In Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 1 9 the Court be-
gan limiting the Cort test, commenting that "implying a pri-
vate right of action on the basis of congressional silence is a
hazardous enterprise, at best."'40 More recently, in Thomp-
son v. Thompson,14 1 the Court refused to find a private
cause of action implied in the Federal Kidnapping Prevention
Act. The rationale used was based solely on the second fac-
tor of the Con test, whether there is an express legislative
intent to allow a private cause of action. Justice Scalia wrote
a concurring opinion in Thompson in which he wrote "[i]t
could not be plainer that we effectively overruled the Cort v.
Ash analysis in Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington."14 Although
the Court has not expressly overruled the Cort analysis, it
clearly uses the second prong as a threshold test - a test
that very few cases meet. 43 Justice Scalia concludes his con-
currence by writing that the Court "should get out of the
business of implied private rights of action altogether." 144 If
the Court eventually adopts this as their opinion, the future
of private causes of action for homeless youth, and all oth-
ers, will be extinguished.
V. PROPOSAL
The solution to the problem of homeless education re-
quires an exception to the compulsory education law which
139. 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
140. Id. at 571.
141. 484 U.S. 174 (1988).
142. Id. at 189.
143. Justice Scalia wrote in his concurrence in Thompson that "[t]he recent
history of our holdings is one of repeated rejection of claims of an implied right.
This has been true in nine of eleven recent private right of action cases heard by
this Court, including the instant case." Id. at 190.
144. Id. at 192.
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allows for a new definition of residency. Many competing
factors need to be analyzed in order to insure that each
homeless youth is not only afforded the right to a public
education but permitted to attend a school which can be
determined with little difficulty and not slowed by endless
administrative hearings or judicial processes.
To effectuate this expanded definition of residency, the
following addition should be made to the California Educa-
tion Code under division four which contains special educa-
tion programs. Part 37 would be entitled "Educational Pro-
grams for the Homeless" and read as follows:
Section 65000 - Legislative Findings and Declarations
The Legislature finds and declares that all individuals
with exceptional needs have a right to participate in free
appropriate public education and that special educational
instruction and services for these persons are needed in or-
der to ensure them of the right to an appropriate education-
al opportunity to meet their unique needs.
It is the intent of the Legislature to assure that all indi-
viduals with exceptional needs are provided their rights to
appropriate programs and services which are designed to
meet their unique needs as defined by the Stewart B.
McKinney Homeless Assistance Act.
Section 65001 - Individuals with Exceptional Needs
(a) The County Superintendent of Schools shall be responsi-
ble for actively searching for and identifying individuals who
qualify under this part.
(b) The County Superintendent of Schools shall assign the
student to any school within the county; such school shall be
in the child's best interest.
(c) The term homeless as used under this part shall be the
same as defined in the Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assis-
tance Act.
Section 65002 - Homeless Education Programs
The legislature finds and declares that in order to effectively
educate those who are homeless the following must occur:
(1) that individualized or small group instruction in core
academic subjects be provided to allow individuals identified
under this part to attain an educational level equivalent to
that individual's chronological age; and
(2) that children identified under this part be assimilated
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with the children of similar age in non-academic subjects.
Section 65003 - Funding
(a) The state shall make available to the County Superinten-
dent of Schools funding equal to the amount required for
the implementation of actively searching for and identifying
individuals who qualify under this part.
(b) The state shall make available to the individual school dis-
tricts for each homeless child enrolled, funding available to
cover the costs of educating, supplying, and administrating
the program under this part.
(c) Funding will also be available to the schools to allow indi-
viduals identified under this part to participate in any
extra-curricular activities the school may offer, with no ex-
pense to the student or his parent.
Section 65004 - School Records
The County of Superintendent of Schools shall be required
to keep a duplicate copy of the scholastic records, including,
any immunization records, for any individual identified under
this part and shall be made available to any requesting
school district or the parent or guardian of the student with-
in one business day after their request is made.
Section 65005 - Awareness Education
(a) All public elementary, junior high, and senior high
schools shall include in their curricula educational materials
that deal with the homeless problem to foster a better under-
standing of the problem in general, and specifically how it
impacts individuals.
(b) At no time shall any school official, teacher, or other
employee identify any student as "homeless," such conduct
shall be punishable as a misdemeanor.
Section 65006 - Regulations
The California Department of Education is hereby instructed
and authorized to promulgate regulations to ensure immedi-
ate and consistent implementation of this part.
The purpose of this part is to ensure that homeless chil-
dren are properly educated, socialized into the mainstream
culture, and that enough funding is allocated for this pur-
pose.
A. The Educational Program
The implementation of the homeless child's education
program must address two distinct issues. Firstly, because of
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her homeless condition, the child is likely to have little conti-
nuity in her educational program. In such a situation the
student takes significantly longer to achieve the next grade
level of competency.
The case of the children of migrant laborers is analo-
gous and has been studied in great detail. The problem of
leaving one school for another is common to both children
of migrant laborers and the homeless. "The average migrant
student may be in three different schools a year, with result-
ing fragmentation.""' This fragmentation which results
from attending several schools in one year is extremely pro-
hibitive to the student attaining a complete education.
"Roughly three years are required for the average migrant
student in some states to advance one grade level."
146
Thus, continuity is an important factor in the education of
any student. With individualized or small group instruction,
the student will be better able to maintain educational norms
throughout their scholastic careers and allow for the child to
more easily restart the learning process at their appropriate
level at a new school.
The second factor is the homeless child's ability to inter-
act with other children. One of the most important functions
of a school-attendance experience is the interaction with oth-
er children. By requiring the homeless child to take "regular"
non-academic courses with non-homeless students, such as
physical education and other electives, because these courses
do not depend on continuity, the student will be able to
interact with other children and realize the important social-
ization effect of schooling.
B. Funding
Without a financial incentive for schools and counties to
seek out homeless children, as a practical matter, and for the
most part, it will not occur. Although funding will be the
most difficult issue to overcome in an era of budget deficits
and a call for lower taxation, without an investment in our
future, the costs will only be more expensive later.
145. Harrington, How Educatops Can llelp Children of the Road, 53 EDUC. Dic.,
14 (Feb. 1988).
146. Id. at 15.
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California has a choice, either invest now and make
homeless children productive members of society upon reach-
ing adulthood, or be forced to support these people for the
rest of their lives on state welfare rolls. As residents of the
most affluent state in the country, we should also be con-
cerned with the fact that we are unable to supply even mini-
mal housing to all of our residents.
C. Determining the Child's Best Interests
The child's best interests are nebulous and encompass a
wide range of considerations. First, education should be con-
tinuous and not broken up by constant reshuffling of the
student from school to school. There will be little time to de-
velop relationships with teachers and fellow students if the
youth is continually moved. Additionally, the student will be
unable to comprehend any one subject and as a result will
require constant review of the subject matter, as discussed
above.
Second, the availability and cost associated with transpor-
tation must be considered. If the student is constantly mov-
ing around an area which contains several school districts, or
even within a particular district, transporting the student to
the classroom presents an additional problem. In a time
where funding resources for any extra activities are scarce,
transportation must be considered when making a decision
as to the best location in which to educate the student. If
the student primarily resides in one district, but occasionally
is sheltered in a second district, it is entirely feasible that a
third district, central to all of the shelters visited by the stu-
dent, will be most appropriate. Although this example is
extreme, it provides an illustration of the types of consider-
ations which must be made when considering what is in the
pupil's best interest.
D. Abuse of the Residency Requirement
Safeguards must be provided so there is no abuse of the
expanded residency requirement. Issues surrounding public
education constantly arise and parents search for ways to
maintain their children in free public education and at the
same time avoid the perceived pitfalls. In the early 1970's,
the desegregation issues instilled in many parents the desire
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to place their children in schools unaffected by desegregation
and not in schools as determined by their residence. The
current drive for the year-round school'4 7 may also prompt
parents to improperly change their child's school.
If the proposal of this comment is adopted, many par-
ents may view this provision as a loophole to be used to
keep their children out of a school with undesirable charac-
teristics. However, this is not the intention of the proposed
provision.
Safeguards such as signing an affidavit under penalty of
perjury and establishing a maximum income level to deter-
mine the homeless status could be instituted, but must re-
main flexible. However, school administrators should be
aware of the susceptibility to fraud that these safeguards can
not protect against. These devices should, nonetheless, dis-
courage the majority of those who will abuse the provision.
Additional safeguards are still required in order to pre-
serve the school system in its present form. Because so many
of the homeless youth are maladjusted, 4 ' school adminis-
trators and instructors should be able to more easily recog-
nize these students.
Also, resources should be spent in properly adjusting the
homeless youth to their new scholastic "culture" to insure
that these students can take full advantage of their opportu-
nity to attend public school.
E. Reconciling with McKinney
The solution proposed only deals with that part of the
McKinney Act which insures that students will be admitted to
the school which is in his or her best interest. In comparing
the proposal to the McKinney Act, all of the major provi-
sions are fulfilled. The Act calls for the adoption of a state
plan of which this proposal would be a part. The county
superintendent under this proposal would be charged with
147. In many school districts, because of increasing enrollment and decreasing
budgets, the districts have been forced to search for new ways to educate its stu-
dents. One solution currently being implemented is year-round schools. The
student takes three one-month vacations instead of one three-month "summer"
vacation. Many parents oppose this solution and may attempt to relocate their
children to other schools unaffected by this "solution."
148. Dobbin, The Children of 1he Homeless, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, 20
(Aug. 3, 1987).
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determining the best interests of the student. In addition, the
county superintendent in being responsible for determining
the school in the child's best interest will also be charged
with maintaining a duplicate set of the student's records. The
McKinney Act provides that the school records of each
homeless child or youth shall be maintained so that the re-
cords are available, in a timely fashion, when a child or
youth enters a new school district.'49 By having the county
maintain a duplicate set of records for the student and for-
ward such records at time of the determination of the home-
less child's best interest, the McKinney Act will be complied
with.
In the event a student resides in two counties, the coun-
ty in which the student attends school more frequently would
be charged with making the decisions and keeping the dupli-
cate set of records. Because student's school records are not
voluminous, the additional resources in maintaining a dupli-
cate set will not cause an undue hardship to the school dis-
tricts or central county agency.
F. Reconciling with the Domicile Concept
The domicile concept in California requires that individ-
uals only have one domicile and most people have only one
residence, both being in the same fixed location. At first, it
appears that the proposed solution ends the necessity for the
residency or domicile concept. However, it is still important
in the determination of the right to an education. The home-
less are domiciled in limbo, and may actually be domiciled
several hundred miles away from their present locale. Howev-
er, the homeless have clearly established a pseudo-domicile
for some purposes. For example, in Collier v. Menzel, 5 ' the
homeless were allowed to vote in Santa Barbara County us-
ing an address which was clearly not their established and
legal domicile. Analogous to this situation is the case of edu-
cating homeless youth. Wherever the youth is presently living
will clearly be his or her "domicile" for school attendance
purposes. Of course, if the local education agency determines
that the child's best interest is in attending a school district
149. 42 U.S.C. § l1432(e)(6)(A) (West Supp. 1988).
150. See supra notes 102-10 and accompanying text.
1990]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
which is clearly not where the student is living, an exception
to the domicile concept much like the exceptions provided
to other students'5 ' will result.
G. The "Choice" Plan
A plan has been suggested at both the federal and Cali-
fornia State levels with regard to education known as the
"choice" plan. Essentially, this plan provides that parents
decide for each of their children where the student should
attend school. The state's education subsidy for each student
would be paid to the school to which that student is attend-
ing, not the district of residence as it is presently done.
For the homeless, this solution seems ideal. The residen-
cy requirement would be ended and for these purposes
would no longer matter where a student resides or was do-
miciled. The student would simply attend the school most
convenient for him or her. However, when the plan is fully
adopted a homeless child may not be able to attend any
school.'52 Schools will become highly competitive to enter,
much like university education is today. The closest school in
proximity to the homeless youth could be unreasonably dis-
tant. Especially in view of the fact that homeless youth are
educationally below-average as a class, they will only be able
to attend schools which have received a low "educational
rating." These schools will have less students, therefore, less
funding, because students will naturally move toward schools
with better reputations. The schools that the homeless attend
may not only be low in educational ranking, but also poorly
equipped to handle the special problems of the homeless,
many of whom have an educational deficiency.'53
VI. CONCLUSION
The homeless problem is growing and all aspects are in
151. See generaUy CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48204 (Deering 1987).
152. This rationale also applies to those in poverty stricken neighborhoods as
well. The students will continue to receive a poor quality education and only
those who can afford to transport their children to "better" schools will receive
the benefit of this change in the education system. The poverty stricken can least
afford transportation of their children to the better schools and will suffer more
than proportionally.
153. See supra notes 144-45 and accompanying text.
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need of immediate solutions. One-half million children are
homeless and each one of them is not only entitled to a
public education, but is in dire need of it. The solution to
this problem involves a multi-faceted approach. There are
limited resources from which to draw upon and implement-
ing a solution will not be easy. Many plans to solve this
problem have been suggested. However, many of these plans
are impractical and could end up making a large problem
worse.
The purpose of this comment was to analyze the sources
of law which impact upon the homeless education problem.
This purpose was accomplished by examining federal and
state judicial and legislative analysis as well as proposed solu-
tions to the problem. The McKinney Act presents a good
basis with which to address the problem, but does not go far
enough. The individual states must do more in order to
solve this societal problem which unchecked is destined to
repeat itself. It is clear that California's present law must be
changed. The exclusion of the homeless from public educa-
tion has no place in our society. The "choice" plan is an
attempt to allow access to better public schools by America's
middle class at the cost of the homeless and the poverty
stricken.
The proposed solution draws upon many sources and
adopts many different aspects of several plans, but above all
it remains flexible as to the homeless student to insure that
the youth is educated. Unlike the present circumstances and
proposed plans, the solution offered will not upset the pres-
ent balance, yet insures that the homeless are quickly placed
into the public education system. The proposed solution
should be adopted, because it will put an end to the cycle of
poverty that has trapped the homeless, alleviate the need for
future assistance programs for the homeless, and ultimately
benefit all society.
Andrew S. Hughes
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